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imparted. The paper analyzes the distribution of the latter 
characteristics over different regions, income groups, and 
levels of indebtedness using graphical analysis. Using 
regression analysis, it investigates the extent to which 
basic economic factors can explain the characteristics of 
public debt management strategies across countries. 
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mmelecky@worldbank.org 1 Introduction
Governments have to often borrow in order to ￿nance expenditures on public goods
and services that promote growth and increase nations￿welfare. The decision of how
much to borrow is that of ￿scal policy which determines the targeted level of debt
based on a sustainability analysis of government debt. One concept of sustainability
relates to solvency, the ability of the government to service its debt obligations in
perpetuity without explicit default, Burnside (2004). Another concept put forth
by Burnside (2004) renders ￿scal sustainability a broader scope by relating it to
the government￿ s ability to maintain its current policies while remaining solvent.
Within the latter concept, one can discuss the types and consequences of ￿scal and
monetary policy adjustments needed to avoid future insolvency. Even more broadly,
this concept can encompass discussions on the optimality of ￿scal policy rather than
its mere feasibility.
Once the government decides on how much funding needs to be raised, it has to
further determine the form in which the funds will be delivered.1 In other words, the
government has to decide which debt instruments are going to be used to raise the
intended funding. Similar to any other private borrower, the government will seek the
best terms for its borrowing. However, given the size of government borrowing, the
analogy to a private investor might be misleading as none of the government￿ s choices
or policy actions is considered to be irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome,2 see e.g.
Missale (2000). A government￿ s seeking of the best borrowing terms refers to the aim
of minimizing the cost of borrowing within existing constraints while respecting the
government￿ s risk preferences (aversion). In other words, the government not only
aims to raise funding at low cost but also to structure the composition of its debt
portfolio in such a way as to minimize the impact of relevant shocks on its budget
1The variety of options that is available to the government certainly varies across countries
mainly with regard to their stage of development.
2One most common example being the possibility of crowding out e⁄ect of government borrow-
ing, see e.g. Briotti (2005) or Elmendorf and Mankiw (1998), but also a crowding-in e⁄ect of public
￿nance can be expected, see e.g. Alani (2006) or Friedman B. (1978). Also, given the size of gov-
ernment debt portfolio its ￿nancial characteristics may constitute a systemic risk for the domestic
￿nancial sector.
1or long-term expenditure plan. The debt instruments for ￿nancing of government
debt are determined by the public debt managers based on the delegated authority
from the government.3 The debt portfolio composition is thus the policy instrument
of public debt managers.
The fundamental document that guides debt managers in their decisions and
operations is the public debt management strategy. The strategy is built upon foun-
dations (goals) stated in government￿ s debt management objectives. The debt man-
agement objectives are usually expressed along the following lines, see IMF and WB
(2001):
The main objective of public debt management is to ensure that the gov-
ernment￿ s ￿nancing needs and its payment obligations are met at the low-
est possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent
degree of risk.
The debt management objectives also typically contain sections addressing the
government￿ s involvement in domestic bond market development and coordination
of its actions with ￿scal and monetary policies. The latter relates to the fact that the
objectives of ￿scal policy, monetary policy, and public debt management di⁄er but
there are various interdependencies among their policy instruments, see e.g. Wheeler
(2004) or Togo (2007). Missale (2000) argues that the objectives of minimizing the
expected cost of debt servicing and minimizing risk are of little help operationally.
According to Missale the objectives are also unuseful as principles on which one
can construct benchmark portfolios against which the performance of debt managers
could be evaluated.4 He bases his arguments on the fact that meeting government
3The process underlying delegation of authority to the debt management o¢ ce to borrow and
execute related transactions in ￿nancial markets on behalf of the state is described in more detail
in IMF and WB (2001) and Wheeler (2004).
4Simple as it seems, it might be a di¢ cult task to evaluate performance of debt managers
against a benchmark portfolio as not achieving the benchmark may be desirable on some occasions.
One can use the analogy of the role of an in￿ ation forecast in in￿ ation targeting. Although, policy
instruments are used to anchor in￿ ation expectations at the targeted level the actual future in￿ ation
can end up away from the target due to the e⁄ect of unexpected shocks or shocks that the monetary
policy does not want to counteract.
2objectives is not an easy task to accomplish, especially in the absence of any theory
of the appropriate degree of risk-aversion that a government should exhibit, or more
generally elicit the preferences of society on this matter. Ideally, the debt manage-
ment objectives of the government including its risk preference (aversion) guide the
debt managers in the design of debt management strategy, and are re￿ ected in the
chosen cost-risk trade-o⁄.
Now consider the process by which the strategy comes about in practice. The
debt management strategy is proposed by the debt management authority or more
speci￿cally its middle o¢ ce5 to the minister of ￿nance. The ￿nance minister then
reviews and approves the proposed strategy, often based on the input of the advisory
board for debt management. The advisory board can comprise representatives of
￿scal policy, government administration, monetary policy, and other regulatory and
supervising bodies a⁄ected by the course of the debt management strategy. The
review and approval of a debt management strategy at the level of a minister of
￿nance is aimed at ensuring that the proposed strategy is consistent with the debt
management objectives of the government, including its preference for risk.
In general, the formalized debt management strategy can take two basic forms.
Either be presented in terms of guidelines or constitute a benchmark for the optimal
government debt portfolio. The former relates to a document which guides the debt
managers on types of risks that should be considered as relatively more important,
and thus indirectly points to the desired structure of a debt portfolio. Therefore,
the guidelines provide directions for future debt management operations rather than
quantitative targets. On the other hand, strategic benchmarks state explicitly what
are the desired risk characteristics of the optimal debt portfolio in a quantitative
manner. The strategic benchmarks can quantify the targeted risk characteristics of
the optimal debt portfolio either in terms of speci￿c magnitudes or more often speci￿c
ranges. The basic types of risks that debt managers should consider when designing
their strategy are discussed in detail in e.g. Wheeler (2004, pp. 17) while various
pitfalls arising in debt management and constituting hidden risks are discussed in
5See Wheeler (2004) and IMF and WB (2003) for detailed description of the organizational
structure of debt management authorities.
3IMF and WB (2000, box 2). For the purpose of this paper we consider three basic
types of risks: (i) foreign currency (FX) risk, (ii) re￿nancing (roll-over) risk, and (iii)
interest rate risk. Risk type (i) addresses the desired currency composition of the
debt portfolio, i.e. the relative weight on domestic currency versus foreign currency
debt. Further, the currency composition of the foreign currency debt itself can be also
addressed. Risk type (ii) addresses the desired maturity structure and redemption
pro￿le of the debt. Risk type (iii) deals with the desired proportion of ￿ oating as
opposed to ￿xed interest rate debt or, in some cases, the price-indexed debt.6
Another attribute of a debt management strategy that will be considered in this
paper is whether such a formal document is made public. The debt management
strategy is considered as public if it is published either in the annual report of the
debt management body, or made available on the respective website.
This paper aims to summarize and analyze the results of a survey on debt man-
agement strategies conducted by the Banking and Debt Management Department
of the World Bank. We will focus on three main ￿ndings related to the debt man-
agement strategies across countries. Namely, (i) whether a public debt management
strategy exists in a given country, (ii) whether it is made public, and (iii) in which
form it is presented, i.e. either in the form of guidelines or a strategic benchmark.
We will analyze the distribution of the latter characteristics over di⁄erent regions,
income groups and levels of indebtedness using graphical analysis. Moreover, we
will use regression analysis to investigate to which extent selected economic indi-
cators can explain the characteristics of public debt management strategies across
countries. In expectation of the results we would like to set forth the following hy-
potheses. Namely, that increasing income levels increase the incidence of strategies;
that increasing levels of indebtedness show a positive but likely non-linear (hump-
shaped) relationship with the incidence of debt strategies; and that countries facing
larger shocks show lower incidence of debt strategies. To our knowledge this paper
6Regarding the ful￿llment of a strategy one can also think of specifying the pace at which the
strategic benchmark should be reached, as the latter represents another level of the cost-risk trade-
o⁄. More speci￿cally, in order to move the current debt portfolio structure faster towards the
benchmark￿ s structure the debt managers would have to proportionally relax their cost considera-
tions as both restructuring of the debt portfolio or hedging can be costly.
4is a ￿rst attempt to analyze di⁄erences in public debt management strategies across
countries and contribute to better understanding of the development economics of
public debt management.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the an-
alyzed survey data and its collection. Section 3 contains graphical analysis of the
survey data across income groups, regions and levels of indebtedness. Section 4 car-
ries our regression analysis of the survey data using economic indicators as candidate
explanatory variables. Section 5 provides a summary of ￿ndings and conclusions.
2 The Survey Data
Progressing in the e⁄orts to better understand the development economics of public
debt management strategies across di⁄erent country groups and individual coun-
tries, the Banking and Debt Management Department of the World Bank conducted
a survey on public debt management strategies. The survey was carried out during
the period from August 2006 to February 2007 and covers OECD, IBRD and Blend
countries.7 The questionnaire was sent out to and completed by national author-
ities responsible for public debt management, or if not feasible the questionnaire
was completed by the relevant country economist based on a dialog with the na-
tional governments. The information from the questionnaire was supplemented by
a search through websites of institutions responsible for central government￿ s debt
management. The questionnaire asked the following questions8
(i) Has the government established a debt management strategy for the
total central government debt portfolio?
(ii) Is the debt management strategy document published?
7The applied classi￿cation into country groups is that of the World Bank and is available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/
0,,contentMDK:20421402~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html
8The survey was made con￿dential regarding the aswers of individual countries so that no country
examples appear in the paper.
5(iii) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for the total debt
portfolio?
The questions were answered in a Yes/No manner and converted to 1=0 entries
for each country, respectively. Regarding point (i), due to the formulation of the
question the positive answers may include implicit strategies. After acquiring all
observation the data were reviewed and some adjustments made to ensure their
consistency across countries.9 The latter pertains to ensuring that the unobserved
quality of debt management strategies which are not made public meets certain
criteria. Namely, the emphasis was placed on the fact that a debt management
strategy has to address the cost-risk trade-o⁄, not only the cost of ￿scal ￿nancing.
This requirement thus excludes references to purely ￿scal expenditure frameworks or
frameworks addressing ￿scal sustainability. Concerning point (ii) the questionnaire
was supplemented by website search to obtain the strategy documents. In point (iii)
all countries that appeared to have at least one benchmark target or targeted range
for one of the three risks below quali￿ed for a positive answer.
If countries have established a strategic target/benchmark for their public debt
portfolio they were asked which types of risks the strategic target/benchmark ad-
dresses. Namely, they were asked
(iii.a) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for currency risk
(% domestic vs. % foreign)?
(iii.b) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for interest rate
risk (% ￿xed vs. % ￿oating; average time to re￿xing (months); or modi￿ed
or Macaulay duration (years))?
(iii.c) Have you established a strategic target/benchmark for re￿nancing
risk (ceiling on debt maturing within one year (% of total outstanding);
or average time to maturity (years))?
The Yes/No answers to the latter questions were also converted into 1=0 entries.
9I am grateful to Lars Jessen and Antonio Velandia for their help in this process and Phillip
Anderson, Elizabeth Currie and Tomas Magnusson for their expert inputs.
6The entire data set covers 105 countries where the analysis of question (i) is based
on all 105 observations, and analyses of questions (ii) and (iii) on 66 observations
on strategies. To broadly characterize our sample, we ￿nd that out of the total
of 105 countries 66 countries have a public debt management strategy, of those 38
communicate their strategies in terms of guidelines, and 28 in terms of benchmarks.
Regarding the source of information that provided the basis for our classi￿cation
40% of countries responded to the questionnaire either by themselves or via the
WB￿ s country o¢ ce. In case of 9% of the countries the information from needs
assessments conducted by the Banking and Debt Management Department was used
and updated by means of a website search. Finally, 51% of countries were classi￿ed
based on information from the relevant websites, 46% of those are OECD countries
and the remainder are countries for which a response either to the questionnaire
sent out for the PDM forum, the questionnaire sent out directly to the relevant debt
management authorities, or to WB￿ s country o¢ ces10 was not recovered. If none of
the applied ￿ve information channels worked out the country was assigned a response
of "No" to question (i), which excluded it from the analysis of questions (ii) and (iii).
There are 21 non-OECD countries that were assigned a response of "No" in such a
manner.
What concerns the regression analysis presented in section 4, the data sample
employed is reduced due to unavailable data for some of the economic indicators used
to explain the variation in strategies￿characteristics across countries. We discuss the
countries included in the regression analysis and the availability of data for estimation
in section 4.2.
3 Graphical Analysis
In this section we analyze how the probability of having a public debt management
strategy varies across di⁄erent income groups and regions. We use the World Bank￿ s
income classi￿cation to divide countries into groups of high income, upper-middle
10The WB￿ s country o¢ ces were asked to respond after a dialog with the relevant country￿ s
authorities or after a thorough assessment of the subject matter.
7income, and lower-middle income.11 Similarly, we use WB￿ s regional classi￿cation
to divide countries into regional groups of East Asia and Paci￿c (EAP), Europe and
Central Asia (ECA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and
North Africa (MNA), South Asia (SAR), and Sub-Saharan Africa (AFR).12 We will
discuss the division of countries into groups according to their levels of indebtedness
directly in section 3.3.
3.1 Comparison across Income Groups
Figure (1) shows the percentage of countries in our sample that have a public debt
management strategy when looking across di⁄erent income groups. Further, panel B
of Figure (1) shows what percentage of strategies is made public, and what percentage
of strategies is expressed in terms of a strategic benchmark as opposed to strategic
guidelines when looking across di⁄erent income groups.
Consider ￿rst panel A of Figure (1). As expected middle-income countries (MICs)
in general fall behind the high-income countries regarding the percentage of coun-
tries which have a debt management strategy. This would support the hypothesis
that more comprehensive management of public ￿nances comes with a higher stage
of economic development. However, it is interesting to observe that across the two
subgroups of MICs the pattern does not hold with the same signi￿cance, i.e. that
countries in the lower MIC group show similar probability of having a debt manage-
ment strategy as countries in the higher MIC group. A tentative explanation might
be that while MICs pursue implementation of more stable (robust) macroeconomic
policies, a relatively higher improvement in this respect can be observed in the lower
MICs. Nevertheless, the pattern observed in Figure (1) can be to some extent an
artifact of the selected conventional income ranges to group the countries for the
purpose of constructing a histogram. We explore the relationship between income
levels (economic development) and the probability of a country having a strategy
using regression analysis later on in this paper.
11Recall that low income countries are not included in this analysis.
12Footnote 8 provides a link to WB￿ s website containing the list of countries in each income group
and region.
8The percentage of strategies that are made public across income groups shown
in panel B of Figure (1) is positively linked to income levels of individual country
groups. This observation implies that at higher stages of development there is more
demand for transparency and accountability of public debt management, and also
higher capacity to meet such demand. The next characteristic of debt management
strategies plotted in panel B of Figure (1) is the percentage of strategies expressed
in terms of benchmarks as opposed to guidelines. Before examining the data one
can assume two alternative hypotheses. First, one would expect that expressing a
debt management strategy in terms of a benchmark requires higher capacity and
analytical rigor. This is due to the fact that setting numerical bounds for di⁄erent
types of risks consistent with prudent debt management requires comprehensive risk
analysis. Also, MICs may wish to retain greater ￿ exibility a⁄orded by guidelines,
as they are more vulnerable to shocks and changing economic environment. This
is especially true in the case of developing economies that face various constraints.
Second, the MICs could opt for benchmarks more than high income countries since
the capacity to e⁄ectively manage public debt is rather concentrated at more senior
levels so that the strategic benchmark appears to be a more e¢ cient way of guiding
the debt management sta⁄in its daily operations. In addition, the range of risks that
MICs face is broader than that of high income countries, and this relatively higher
complexity of risk management proves to be better handled via benchmarks for all
the risks the government wants to address. We can observe in the histogram that the
probability of country using a benchmark to express its strategy is positively related
to the levels of income, a ￿nding consistent with our ￿rst hypothesis.
3.2 Comparison across Regions
We now proceed to look at the distribution of the characteristics of interest across
di⁄erent regions. Panel A of Figure (2) plots the percentage of strategies out of
the total number of observations in di⁄erent regions. Panel B of Figure (2) shows
the percentage of strategies made public in each region, as well as the percentage of
strategies in each region expressed as a strategic benchmark.
9We can observe in panel A that the probability of an OECD country having
a debt management strategy is signi￿cantly higher than the probability of a non-
OECD country having a debt management strategy. This observation can again be
seen as a call for higher accountability, at least operational13, as a country reaches
higher stages of development. A strategy is linked to operational accountability
through a requirement to report and explain deviations of actions undertaken by debt
management from those consistent with the strategy. Even though, the percentage
of strategies in place reported for the high income countries does not reach 100%
the implicit reference point is in fact 100% as some OECD countries without a debt
management strategy show extremely low levels of indebtedness, so that having a
debt management strategy is not a priority itself. In addition, some OECD countries
may not have a traditional debt management strategy in face of extremely deep and
liquid ￿nancial markets and stable macroeconomic policies. Consider now the regions
in accord with WB￿ s classi￿cation. We exclude SAR from our interpretations due
only to 1 available observation. Out of the considered regions, ECA appears to be the
leading region with the highest incidence of strategies, followed by MNA. As for the
remaining regions the percentage of countries having a debt management strategy
is below 50% and it is interesting to see that LAC and EAP are falling behind the
MICs of Africa.
Consider now panel B of Figure (2). It is interesting to observe that not all of
the strategies are made available to the public even in OECD countries, and that
certain debt managers prefer a lower degree of transparency in order to preserve more
room for their maneuvers.14 For some countries the non-transparency might have
di⁄erent origins, though. Non-OECD countries again lag behind the OECD countries
in the percentage of public strategies. However, ECA not only leads the group of
WB￿ s regions regarding the percentage of public strategies, but is as a region more
13In a nutshell, operational accountability amounts to reporting and explaining actions with
respect to objectives, here those of debt management. See e.g. Buiter (2006) for more elaborate
description of operational versus substantive accountabilility.
14This preference could be especially justi￿able if countries face higher uncertainty and operate
within a stringent accountability framework. Even public guidelines could thus be constraining in
fact.
10transparent that the group of OECD countries. In this respect, EAP and AFR follow
after ECA while only MNA fails to cross the threshold of 50% of public strategies.
When we turn to the percentage of strategies expressed in terms of benchmarks
the OECD countries dominate in this respect the non-OECD countries, see also
section 3.1. From the WB￿ s regions, ECA, followed by LAC shows the highest
percentage of strategic benchmarks, a slightly lower one than the corresponding
percentage for OECD countries. One could be curious whether the higher incidence
of benchmarks in ECA and LAC could be attributed to a relatively higher analytical
capacity for risk management in ECA and LAC in comparison with AFR, EAP and
MNA.
3.3 Comparison across Levels of Indebtedness
The ￿rst row of panels in Figure (3) shows the distributions of the percentage of
strategies out of total observations across country groups with di⁄erent levels of
indebtedness. The second row of panels in Figure (3) shows distributions of the per-
centage of public strategies and benchmarks out of strategies across country groups
with di⁄erent levels of indebtedness. The distributions are constructed using two
di⁄erent bases. In both cases countries were ￿rst ordered in ascending order in terms
of their levels of indebtedness. The ￿rst column of panels in Figure (3) uses the
ranges of indebtedness to classify countries into groups. The second column of pan-
els in Figure (3) divides the countries into groups of an equal size. The two slightly
di⁄erent approaches will help us get a better picture about the distribution of the
characteristics of interest across levels of indebtedness.
Consider now the ￿rst row of Figure (3) which shows the distribution of the
percentage of countries with strategies. Starting from the left, we can observe that
the relationship between the probability of a country having a strategy and its level
of indebtedness is hump-shaped where countries with debt levels as a percentage of
GDP higher than 100% have the smallest probability of having a strategy, i.e. smaller
than countries with levels of indebtedness between 0￿100%. However, countries with
smallest levels of indebtedness between 0 ￿ 50% have lower probability of having a
11strategy than countries with a medium level of indebtedness ranging from 50 to 100
percent. The second plot in the ￿rst row of panels supports the ￿nding of a hump-
shaped relationship between indebtedness and an existence of a strategy. However,
the story coming from the tails of the distribution appears opposite to that from the
￿rst plot. Namely, that countries with high levels of indebtedness have still higher
probability of having a strategy than countries with small levels of indebtedness.
The distribution of the percentage of public strategies across levels of indebtedness
is shown in the second row of panels in Figure (3). From the ￿rst plot it appears
that the relationship is rather non-linear and close to the U-shape. However, the
second plot contradicts this pattern and shows a strong linear relationship between
the percentage of public strategies and levels of indebtedness. This implies that
the higher the indebtedness of a country the more likely is the country to be non-
transparent about its debt management. We will investigate the latter relationship
further using regression analysis later on in this paper to get more de￿nite answers.
Finally, the second row of panels in Figure (3) also shows the distribution of
benchmark strategies across levels of indebtedness. The left-hand side histogram
suggests a hump-shaped relationship between benchmark strategies and the levels of
indebtedness. The hump-shaped relationship implies that as countries are becoming
more indebted they use benchmarks more often to express their strategies. However,
as countries become highly indebted the use of benchmarks in debt management
decreases. Although a non-linearity is also suggested by the plot on the right it
follows a U-shape as opposed to a hump-shape thus completely contradicting the
implications from the ￿rst plot. Again, we hope to ￿nd more conclusive insights into
this relationship using regression analysis carried out in section 4.
3.4 Further Inspection of Strategic Benchmarks
In this section we further decompose the strategic benchmarks into three basic types
of risk that the benchmarks can be addressing. These are namely foreign exchange
(FX) risk, interest rate risk and re￿nancing risk. Using graphical analysis, we exam-
ine the relative weight of the three types of risk in the existing benchmarks across
12di⁄erent income groups, regions, and levels of indebtedness. Figure (4) plots the
frequency (in percentages) with which a given type of risk is addressed in the bench-
marks. Panel A of Figure (4) does so while considering di⁄erent income groups,
panel B di⁄erent regions, and panels C and D varying levels of indebtedness. In
all panels we show an average proportion of all the three di⁄erent risks addressed
in strategic benchmarks, denoted by "average". The latter is computed as the un-
weighted average of incidence with which each of the three risks is addressed in
strategic benchmarks.
It appears that the average number of di⁄erent risks the benchmarks in MICs
address is higher than the average number for high income countries. This is mainly
attributable to the fact that high-income countries are not concerned much with
FX risk and re￿nancing risk as they have access to large and liquid debt markets
usually in local currencies. It is interesting to observe that the average number
of risks addressed in benchmarks by lower MICs is signi￿cantly higher than the
average number of risks addressed by upper MICs. This may be again due to the
fact that lower MICs are more concerned about FX and re￿nancing risk than upper
MICs. This seems to imply that the consideration of re￿nancing risks in strategic
benchmarks is negatively correlated with countries￿income levels. This could apply
to FX risk as well, however here, the relationship is possibly non-linear as upper
MICs show slightly lower percentage of FX risk targets (targeted ranges) in their
benchmarks than high income countries. On the other hand, interest rate risk shows
rather the opposite tendency, i.e. its presence in strategic benchmarks appears to be
more positively correlated with countries￿income levels. For high-income countries
the interest rate risk is probably the only concern given their ￿nancing opportunities,
and from the point of view of MICs it is the risk that is supposedly the easiest one
to manage.
Panel B looks at the distribution of the three risks addressed in strategic bench-
marks using cross-region comparison. The average number of di⁄erent risks addressed
in benchmarks of non-OECD countries seems to be signi￿cantly larger than in the
case of OECD countries. Again, the evidence shows that this is primarily due to the
higher concern of the non-OECD countries about FX and re￿nancing risks. Neverthe-
13less, the proportion of OECD countries concerned about interest rate risk dominates
that of non-OECD countries. It is hard to draw any conclusions for some of the
WB￿ s regions, as AFR, MNA or even EAP, since there is only one observation avail-
able in each case. Our interpretations thus shrink to comparison of ECA and LAC.
LAC seems to be leading in the average number of risks addressed in benchmarks.
Moreover, once a country in the LAC region employs a strategic benchmark for debt
management this benchmark is very likely to include targets (targeted ranges) for
all re￿nancing, interest rate and FX risks. ECA seems to be most concerned about
interest rate risk and the risk pro￿le of this region thus more resembles that of the
OECD countries.
Panels C and D of Figure (4) show the distribution of benchmarks addressing the
three basic types of risk across levels of indebtedness. Panel C uses as the base ranges
of indebtedness whereas panel D puts the countries, in ascending order according to
their levels of indebtedness, into equally populated groups. We can observe that
the average number of di⁄erent risk addressed in the strategic benchmarks is rather
negatively related to the levels of indebtedness, although panel C shows possible
presence of non-linearity. Namely, the countries with levels of indebtedness between
50 ￿ 100% of GDP appear to use a larger number of di⁄erent benchmarks than low
and highly indebted countries. The incidence of re￿nancing risk being addressed in
strategic benchmarks is strongly declining with levels of indebtedness. On the other
hand, the incidence of interest rate risk being addressed in the benchmarks appears
to be ambiguously related to levels of indebtedness as the story from panels C and D
is very di⁄erent. The relationship between levels of indebtedness and the incidence of
exchange rate risk in strategic benchmarks appears to be possibly non-linear based
on the evidence across panels C and D. This is since the countries with levels of
indebtedness between 50￿100% of GDP appear to use targets (targeted ranges) for
exchange rate risk most often and the countries in the range of 100%+ the least.
144 Regression Analysis
In this section we investigate to what extent the existence of a public debt man-
agement strategy in a country can be explained by economic indicators. We will
attribute the unexplained part of the event, i.e. a country having a strategy, to
political, institutional and idiosyncratic (country speci￿c) factors. The economic in-
dicators employed are of a general character and pertain to, for instance, the stage
of economic development, macroeconomic management, indebtedness of a country,
￿ exibility of the applied exchange rate regime, and are described in detail in section
4.1.
Ideally we would be interested in explaining the variation of the quality of debt
management strategies, y￿
i; across countries, i.e.
y
￿
i = Xi￿ + ￿i (1)
using economic indicators Xi: However we do not observe y￿
i instead we observe






where the threshold y￿is set so that the strategy has to at least consider the
cost-risk trade-o⁄when meeting government ￿nancing needs. It is also assumed that
￿i ￿ N (0;￿2): We thus have a vector of yi with 0 and 1 entries corresponding to
a country having or not having a public debt management strategy, and an index
i = 1:::81 denoting the countries in our sample. It can be shown, see e.g. Johnston
and Dinardo (2001), that the latent regression in (1) and the rule in (2) generate a
PROBIT model.
We are interested in modelling the probability that yi takes the value of 1 condi-
tional on selected economic indicators Xi, and thus transforming Xi￿ into a proba-
bility, i.e.
prob(yi = 1) = F (Xi￿) (3)
15where ￿ is a vector of parameters and F (￿) is assumed to be a cumulative standard
Normal distribution. There are two most common alternatives to consider when
choosing the functional form of F. These correspond to models of linear probability,
and LOGIT. Since it appears that in vast majority of empirical cases the three models
seem to produce similar answers (see Johnston and Dinardo, 2001, chapter 13), we
choose to focus on the PROBIT model out of convenience15. This is due to the fact
that unlike the linear probability model the PROBIT model restricts the ￿tted values
to lie between 0 and 1, and we ￿nd its functional form more intuitive for our case
than that of LOGIT.
4.1 Selected Economic Indicators
We now discuss the economic indicators employed as explanatory variables Xi in
the PROBIT model in (3). The selection of those indicators was based on data
availability to maximize the coverage of the survey data, and an agnostic approach
to collecting basic economic indicators related to public debt management. The se-
lected economic indicators include measures of economic development, the level of
indebtedness and regional location in order to extend the graphical analysis of sec-
tion 3. In addition, we focus on some characteristics of government borrowing such
as the proportion of concessional debt, growth of government revenues approximated
by GDP growth, ￿ exibility of applied exchange rate regimes, and volatility of do-
mestic and external shocks that may a⁄ect cash￿ ows related to the debt portfolio or
government primary balance. The volatility of shocks is mainly considered due to
the aim of debt management to minimize the shocks￿impact on government budget
by optimizing the composition of the government debt portfolio. We now discuss the
employed economic indicators in detail.
GDP per capita - this variable is used to approximate the stage of development
of a country. One may expect that the higher the stage of development the higher
the probability that a country has a debt management strategy. A higher stage of
15We still compare the estimation results from the PROBIT model to those from the LOGIT and
LP models to check for possible misspeci￿cation problems.
16development is thus assumed to be associated with a better institutional framework
including a debt management strategy and its public availability. We used also a
quadratic of this variable in the model to capture possible non-linearities, however,
it appeared to be insigni￿cant and is not reported in the estimation results. The
measure of GDP per capita is the PPP converted gross domestic product from the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2006).
Indebtedness of government - increases in this variable, de￿ned as the ratio of
total government debt to GDP, should result in an e⁄ort to consolidate government
￿nances and adopt a debt management strategy. One can also expect that if this
indicator reaches high levels the government may give up on debt management and
focus on debt renegotiations. Although debt renegotiations could be seen as a part of
the debt management strategy we do not include them in our indicator yi: Therefore,
inclusion of a quadratic of government indebtedness into our PROBIT model can be
justi￿ed. As in the case of the GDP per capita the quadratic term appeared to be
insigni￿cant and is not reported in the presented estimation results. The total debt-
to-GDP ratio was obtained from the GDF & WDI Central database of the World
Bank and the EIU database.
Government share of GDP - this variable is used to approximate the importance
of public sector (government) in economic performance of a country. One may expect
that a larger share of government on real GDP would result in a greater e⁄ort to
stabilize government ￿nances in the sake of greater macroeconomic stability. Sim-
ilarly, if government actions are important for an economy the public will require
higher transparency and accountability from the government. Existence of a public
debt management strategy is thus deemed to represent increased e⁄orts of the gov-
ernment to stabilize its ￿nances and meet the requirement of the public for higher
transparency and accountability. The measure used here is the government￿ s share
on real GDP from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2006).
Degree of government debt concessionality - this variables is used to capture the
percentage of government debt ￿nanced by means of concessional resources, e.g. from
multilateral and bilateral donors. We assume that the higher the concessional share
of government debt the lower the incentive for the government to adopt a strategy
17addressing cost-risk trade-o⁄s in ￿nancing decisions, most importantly decisions on
debt composition. This indicator may appear to be perfectly correlated with GDP
per capita, in fact the correlation is estimated to be ￿0:55. Although the correla-
tion can be regarded as high an exclusion of the degree of concessionality from the
regression for strategies was rejected. We use the ratio of concessional debt to total
external debt to approximate this indicator. This measure was obtained from the
GDF & WDI Central database of the World Bank.
Internal macroeconomic management - the standard deviations of CPI in￿ ation
and GDP growth are used to capture quality of internal macroeconomic management.
Since price stability is the basic objective and goal of monetary policy we ￿nd the
standard deviation of in￿ ation indicative of the quality of internal macroeconomic
management. Also, the monetary and ￿scal policies aim at smoothing ￿ uctuations
in economic performance, the economic growth cycle. We again draw the link from
sound and successful macroeconomic policy of a government to its likely engagement
in sound practice regarding public debt management. However, also in this case the
argument can be posed di⁄erently. Namely, that the success of a sound macroeco-
nomic policy will depend on the institutional set up of the economy, such as e.g.
wage negotiation mechanisms or capital adequacy requirements for ￿rms, that deter-
mines the pass-through and size of domestic shocks. Although, the government can
in￿ uence the institutional set up in the long run, facing larger domestic shocks can
lead to adoption of more advanced instruments for public debt management. The
CPI in￿ ation and GDP growth series were obtained from the GDF & WDI Central
database of the World Bank.
Flexibility of exchange rate regimes - we use the standard deviation of the change
in the exchange rate to approximate this indicator. The lower the standard deviation
the lower the ￿ exibility of an exchange rate regime. However, varying volatility of
exchange rates across countries is also attributable to varying impacts or sizes of
external shocks. This would be certainly the case if one dealt only with ￿ oating
exchange rate regimes. In order to condition on the external shocks we employ other
variables such as volatility of current account or the terms of trade, see below. The
standard deviation of exchange rate is computed using the exchange rate series from
18the Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2006).
External macroeconomic management - we use the standard deviation of the cur-
rent account-to-GDP ratio (CA/GDP) to approximate this indicator. It may appear
that the actual exchange rate deviates from the equilibrium exchange rate that brings
the economy to external balance. This is especially true in the case of less ￿ exible
exchange rate regimes present in our sample. If the external macroeconomic man-
agement (policies) are poor, i.e. there are frequent or large deviations of the actual
exchange rate from its equilibrium, this will result in higher variability of external
balances, measured here by CA/GDP. We use the quality of external macroeconomic
policies as one of the indicators of the overall quality of general government policies
and draw a link to the quality of public debt management - existence of a debt man-
agement strategy. To set an alternative hypothesis, one may argue that whatever
the external policy its success, as measured by the standard deviation of CA/GDP
here, depends on the magnitude and frequency of external shocks such as those to
the terms of trade and capital ￿ ows. Further, one may extend this argument and
assume that the higher the importance (impact) of external shocks the more likely is
a country to adopt better instruments for public debt management, such as a debt
management strategy. The series of CA/GDP was retrieved from the GDF & WDI
Central database of the World Bank.
Management of foreign reserves - we measure the quality of management of for-
eign reserves using the coe¢ cient of variation in the stock of FX reserves-to-imports
ratio. Since management of foreign reserves is part of the ￿nancial management of
the consolidated government balance sheet we assume that its quality can be posi-
tively linked to the quality of public debt management. This is especially true if there
exist a high degree of coordination between monetary policy and debt management.
The series of FX reserves as a percentage of imports was taken from the GDF &
WDI Central database of the World Bank.
Volatility of o¢ cial transfers - more speci￿cally we use the coe¢ cient of variation
for net o¢ cial current transfers. This indicator is employed to approximate the
exogenous volatility (risk) in foreign aid that developing countries may face. This
volatility may force countries to take some precautionary actions which may include
19creation of a bu⁄er stock of ￿nances to smooth out the volatility. Increases in the
required o⁄setting ￿nancing could make the country acknowledge the need for a debt
management strategy. On the other hand, if the volatility in foreign aid is disrupting
the ￿nancing plans of the government at some point it could undermine the e¢ cient
continuation of a debt management strategy. The series of net o¢ cial transfers was
taken from the GDF & WDI Central database of the World Bank.
Regional dummy variables - we include also regional dummies into the regression
to explore the possibility that the existence of a strategy is dependent on the region
a country belongs to. The regional classi￿cation corresponds to that used through-
out the graphical analysis in section 2.16 When constructing the regional dummy
variables we take as a base the LAC region due to the highest number of available
observations.
All indicators were calculated using available annual data covering the period
from 1990 to 2006.
4.2 Estimation Results
This section reports and discusses the results of PROBIT model estimation. Recall
that by using the PROBIT model we try to explain the probability of a country hav-
ing a public debt management strategy using selected economic indicators discussed
in section 4.1. The maximization of the log-likelihood of the PROBIT model17 is
carried out using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. The inference is based
on the quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard errors due to Huber and White18
16We have tried to insert a regional dummy taking 1 if the country was an OECD country and
0 otherwise, but this dummy appeared to be insigni￿cant and was dropped from the estimation.
This is most likely due to its colinearity of 0:87 with the income levels of the countries.


























where ￿ is standard Normal cumulative distribution and ￿ is the standard deviation of the unob-
served shock in the regression underlying the PROBIT model, see e.g. Johnston and Dinardo for
further details.
18The QML variance covariance matrix is computed as
20which are robust to general misspeci￿cation of the conditional distribution of yi. As a
check for possible misspeci￿cation problems we estimate the LOGIT and LP models
for yi using the same set of explanatory variables. The sample used for estimation
includes 81 countries, shown in Table (3) for which data on the employed economic
indicators were available. 29 of the countries included in the regression are OECD
countries, 7 of them from AFR, 6 from EAP, 19 from ECA, 19 from LAC, and 8
from MNA.19 The results are reported in Table (1).
The estimation results are broadly consistent across the PROBIT, LOGIT and
LP models so that there seems to be no obvious signs of misspeci￿cation prob-
lems. PROBIT and LOGIT show signi￿cantly better ￿t than the LP model and
the estimated coe¢ cients from those models are generally more signi￿cant than the
estimated coe¢ cients from the LP model.20 The selected economic indicators can
explain about 40% of the incidence when a country has a strategy, and appear to be
jointly highly signi￿cant. We attribute the unexplained part to political, institutional
and country-speci￿c factors. We now discuss the e⁄ects of individual variables.
We ￿nd signi￿cant evidence that as the GDP per capita in the country grows,
there is a higher probability that the government will have a public debt manage-
ment strategy. Also, the level of indebtedness shows signi￿cantly positive relation-
ship with the probability of an existing strategy. This implies that as countries get
more indebted they put more weight on e⁄ective debt management where a strategy
document is the basic building block.
The coe¢ cient attached to the share of government on GDP is negative but
statistically indi⁄erent from zero. So that increasing importance of government in





= b H￿1b gb g0 b H￿1
where b H and b g are the gradients (scores) and Hessian of the log likelihood evaluated at the ML
estimates.
19None of the countries from SAR happend to be included in the regression.
20Note that the coe¢ cients from the PROBIT and LOGIT model cannot be interpreted as mar-
ginal e⁄ects of an explanatory variable on the dependent variable as in the case of the LP model.
In the case of PROBIT and LOGIT the marginal e⁄ect varies with the level of the explanatory
variable.
21present debt management strategy.
The increasing degree of governments debt concessionality appears to signi￿cantly
decrease the probability of a country having a debt management strategy. Therefore
reliance of a country on multilateral and bilateral donors may act as an disincentive
for adopting sound public debt management practice.
On the other hand, higher ￿ exibility of an exchange rate regime seems to increase
the probability of a country adopting a debt management strategy. This is due to the
fact that under an exchange rate ￿ oat the country has to deal with FX risk explicitly
and cannot rely on the central bank to defend the ￿xed exchange rate parity as its
intermediate policy target. In fact, with increasing ￿ exibility of an exchange rate
regime the opportunity for government to contract out some part of the FX risk to
the central bank decreases.
The signi￿cantly negative coe¢ cient attached to the standard deviation of CA/GDP
o⁄ers the interpretation that the higher the external macroeconomic vulnerability the
lower the probability of sound public debt management policy. In other words, as
the volatility of external balances increases the probability of a country having a
debt management strategy decreases.
The e⁄ectiveness of FX reserves management seems to increase the probability of
a country having a debt strategy. Successful management of FX reserves can thus be
seen as a positive externality for public debt management, especially if coordinated
with the public debt management. Increasing variations in o¢ cial transfers, yet
another type of an external shock that developing countries can face, appear to have
a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the probability of a country having a debt management
strategy.
Finally, it is interesting to observe that if a country is located in the ECA region
its probability of having a debt management strategy increases signi￿cantly. This is
not true of the other regions considered.
224.3 Extension to Public and Benchmark Strategies
In this section we extend the regression analysis to the binary variables distinguishing
between public debt management strategies made available to the public and those
not available to the public, and further between strategies formulated in terms of






1 if strategy made public
0 if strategy not public
yB
i = f
1 if strategic benchmark
0 if guidelines
(4)
Again we opt for the PROBIT model21 when investigating to what extend can
yP
i and yB
i be explained by selected economic indicators Xi. Since the number of
observations in our sample available for estimation changes noticeably due to a dif-
fering number of observations available for each explanatory variable we resort to
the speci￿c-to-general approach to build up the ￿nal models estimated for yP
i and
yB
i . We start with GDP per capita and add on other relevant variables according to
their signi￿cance while maximizing the coverage of the survey data. We ￿rst discuss
some additional variables that appear in the PROBIT model for yP
i and yB
i , and
which were not signi￿cant when used to explain existence of a strategy, i.e. yi.
GDP growth - when economy performs well and is experiencing higher growth
rates of GDP the government may be more willing to become transparent about
its actions and decisions. This argument implies that with higher GDP growth
government￿ s capacity in meeting public￿ s demand for higher transparency in public
debt management grows as well. The series of GDP growth was obtained from the
Penn World Tables (Heston et al, 2006).
Terms of trade volatility - this variable captures the intensity of real external
shocks that hit the economy. Higher risk of real external shocks, as measured by the
standard deviation, creates a genuine dilemma for country authorities of whether to
21We have carried out the estimation using LOGIT and LP models as well to check on any
mispeci￿cation problems. We did not detect any. The estimation results are available from the
author.
23engage in relatively more accountable frameworks. This is due to the fact that more
intense real external shocks make even operational accountability more burdensome,
and therefore does not necessarily imply a reluctance of country authorities to be
accountable. Following this argument one can expect that higher terms of trade
volatility can result in inclination towards debt management guidelines rather than
strategic benchmarks for debt management. The series was acquired from the GDF
& WDI Central database of the World Bank.
The estimation results for the PROBIT models of yP
i and yB
i are reported in
Table (2). The respective log-likelihoods were again maximized using the BHHH
algorithm and the inference is based on Huber-White QML standard errors.
The estimation results in Table (2) indicate that the probability of a strategy
being available to the public can be from about 21 percent explained by selected
economic indicators. Similarly, the probability of a strategy being expressed in terms
of a strategic benchmark, rather than strategic guidelines, can be from about 47
percent explained by selected economic indicators, a percentage signi￿cantly higher
than in the case of public strategies. The unexplained part of the probability that
yP
i = 1 or yB
i = 1 is attributed to institutional, political and idiosyncratic factors.
We now proceed to a more detailed discussion of our results.
Consider ￿rst the estimation results for yP
i in the ￿rst column of Table (2). We
￿nd that the level of GDP per capita, the level of indebtedness and the average
growth rate do not seem to be important in explaining a country￿ s decision to make
its debt management strategy public. Further, variations in economic growth seem to
negatively impact on the probability of a strategy being made public, however, this
impact is not signi￿cant at common levels. On the other hand, increasing volatility of
domestic prices, as measured by CPI, signi￿cantly a⁄ects the probability of a strat-
egy being public. This result could be related to the e⁄ect of volatility of in￿ ation
on the uncertainty pertaining to government revenues. The government in defence
of its strategy and for the sake of accountability prefers to make its debt manage-
ment strategy available to the public so that the e⁄ect of an unexpected shortfall
in government revenues and the e⁄ect of volatile prices on ￿nancing premiums are
24apparent. Furthermore, increasing standard deviation of the exchange rate seems to
be positively in￿ uencing the decision to make a debt management strategy public.
More ￿ exible exchange rate regimes are often associated with more advanced macro-
economic policy, such as e.g. in￿ ation targeting, the peer pressure within government
institutions can result in more transparent public debt management. Volatility of
the terms of trade seems to have a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the probability of
a strategy being public. If a government is relatively more dependent on tax rev-
enues from tradeable goods and/or its revenues are directly linked to the country￿ s
exports, such as commodities, larger shocks to government revenues could make gov-
ernment reluctant to publish its strategy and later be forced to publicly modify it.
Variations in CA/GDP seem to be positively related to the probability of making
strategy public, though not at common signi￿cance levels. When looking over the
regional dummies we ￿nd that if a country belongs to the ECA region it has signi￿-
cantly higher probability of having made its strategy public. This is not true of the
remaining regions.
Consider now the estimation results for yB
i in the second column of Table (2).
The e⁄ect of GDP per capita on the probability that yB
i = 1, i.e. a strategy is
expressed as a strategic benchmark rather than guidelines for debt management,
appears to be negative. This would imply that developed countries do not favour
strategic benchmarks. This may be due to the fact that they face only a certain type
of risk, most commonly interest rate risk, and even operational sta⁄shows relatively
high capacity for managing this risk, so that the relatively strict and more explicit
guidance of a strategic benchmark is not necessary. The level of indebtedness appears
to be positively related to having a strategic benchmark, however, this e⁄ect is not
statistically signi￿cant at common levels. The results suggest a negative e⁄ect of
average GDP growth on the probability of a benchmark-type strategy. Tentatively
and in relation to developing countries, higher average GDP growth over the period
1990-2006 may indicate less disruptions of macroeconomic performance due to crises
episodes and thus the need of addressing basic risks explicitly is not seen as so
bene￿cial. On the other hand, developed countries experience relatively lower average
growth rates compared to developing countries which might not have the necessary
25analytical capacity to derive benchmark targets. Increasing variation in in￿ ation does
not seem to a⁄ect the probability of using strategic benchmarks. Higher ￿ exibility
of applied exchange rate regimes seems to imply lower probability of a benchmark
debt strategy. This result is somewhat puzzling unless one wants to acknowledge the
in￿ uence of more developed economies on this ￿nding, as most of these apply some
type of a ￿ oating exchange rate regime and often use guidelines for debt management.
Also, the terms of trade volatility impact negatively on the probability of using a
strategic benchmark. If developing countries are often hit by large external shocks
it may be hard for them to set a conventional benchmark with rather well-de￿ned
ranges for selected types of risks. Volatility of CA/GDP appears to be insigni￿cant in
explaining the use of strategic benchmarks. Further, governments appear to be less
in favor of using strategic benchmarks for debt management once facing increasing
variation in o¢ cial transfers (foreign aid). Increasing variation in o¢ cial transfers
can be seen as a speci￿c kind of an external shock that again results in the lower use
of benchmark targets (ranges) for management of the basic types of risk. Finally,
when looking across the coe¢ cient estimates attached to regional dummies we ￿nd
that if a country belongs to the MNA region it has signi￿cantly lower probability of
using a benchmark strategy.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed survey data on public debt management strategies across income
groups, regions and levels of indebtedness using graphical tools. Further, regression
analysis was carried out to extend the graphical analysis and condition on more
economic indicators possibly relevant for public debt management. More speci￿cally,
the graphical and regression analyses were focused on explaining how the incidence of
(i) public debt management strategies, (ii) the published strategies and (iii) strategic
benchmarks varies across income groups, regions, levels of indebtedness and other
economic characteristics.
We found that a higher level of income in a country appears to increase its prob-
ability of having a debt management strategy. The level of indebtedness seems to
26be also positively correlated with the incidence of a strategy where the graphical
analysis indicated that the relationship could be non-linear. The latter would im-
ply that as a country becomes more indebted it aims at increasing the quality of
debt management, however, after reaching high levels of indebtedness it gives up on
debt management and possibly engages in debt renegotiations and focuses on debt
sustainability issues. Across the World Bank￿ s regions, Europe and Central Asia ap-
pears to stand out in regards to the incidence of strategies. Concerning other factors,
the degree of debt concessionality appears to signi￿cantly decrease the probability
of having a strategy, and so does the volatility of external shocks.
In regards to making strategies public, it appears from the graphical analysis
that their incidence is slightly positively related to the income levels, however, the
regression analysis ￿nds this e⁄ect insigni￿cant. The public strategies seem to be also
unrelated to the level of indebtedness. From the regional perspective, it is Europe
and Central Asia, followed by East Asia and Paci￿c, and Sub-Saharan Africa, that
leads in terms of transparency (incidence of public strategies) and outperforms in this
respect even OECD countries as a group. Concerning other factors, the volatility
of domestic and external shocks seems to signi￿cantly a⁄ect the probability of a
present public strategy. In general, the degree to which we can explain the incidence
of public strategies is rather low compared to the incidence of strategies and strategic
benchmarks.
Incidence of strategic benchmarks seems to be slightly positively correlated with
income levels, however, when conditioning on other economic indicators we found a
signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of GDP per capita on a strategy being expressed in terms
of a benchmark. The relationship between benchmark strategies and levels of in-
debtedness appears slightly positive but not signi￿cant at common levels. Europe
and Central Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean appear to have the high-
est incidence of benchmarks among the World Bank￿ s regions. When conditioning
on other economic factors we ￿nd that countries from the Middle East and North
Africa have signi￿cantly lower probability of using benchmark strategies compared
to other regions. Further economic factors which signi￿cantly a⁄ect the incidence of
a benchmark strategy include average GDP growth and volatility of external shocks,
27with a negative e⁄ect on benchmarks incidence, and volatility of domestic shocks,
with a positive e⁄ect on benchmarks incidence.
As mentioned in the introduction, we see this paper as a ￿rst attempt to charac-
terize the variations in the survey data on public debt management strategies across
countries where establishing a regularly repeated survey would be incredibly bene￿-
cial. The follow-up surveys on public debt management strategies could extend the
coverage to all low income countries, and focus on distinguishing between implicit
and formal strategies by structuring the applied questionnaire accordingly. Although
the present work is intended to provide the opportunity for public debt managers
to compare themselves to their peers or countries at a similar stage of development,
some policy implications could be derived from a similar analysis in the future. In
this respect inclusion of some institutional variables would be desirable. Examples
could include the number of institutions responsible for public debt management in
a given country, the degree of central bank independence, existence of a medium-
term expenditure framework, or the degree of transparency of measures concerning
domestic macroeconomic policies.
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30Table 1: Estimation Results - PROBIT Model for Existing Strategies
PROBIT LOGIT LP
Variable Coe¢ cient p-value Coe¢ cient p-value Coe¢ cient p-value
GDPpci 6:7E-5 0:0403 0:0001 0:0342 1:6E-6 0:8470
Indebti 0:0139 0:0421 0:0232 0:0536 0:0019 0:1902
GovSharei ￿0:0269 0:2931 ￿0:0414 0:3557 ￿0:0065 0:3558
(ConsDebt/TotDebt)i ￿0:0216 0:0962 ￿0:0329 0:1485 ￿0:0085 0:0480
stdev (inf)i ￿0:0004 0:4686 ￿0:0007 0:5427 ￿9:7E-5 0:6654
stdev (growth)i ￿0:0649 0:2863 ￿0:1134 0:2721 ￿0:0182 0:3182
stdev (ER)i 2:2E-6 0:1137 4:4E-6 0:1261 2:5E-7 0:3143
stdev (CA/GDP)i ￿0:1694 0:0241 ￿0:3008 0:0264 ￿0:0222 0:0672
stdev (FXRes/IM)i 3:8911 0:0262 7:0172 0:0451 0:5549 0:0467
coefvar(O¢ cTrans)i ￿0:2400 0:0003 ￿0:4093 0:0007 ￿0:0133 0:2825
constant ￿0:0231 0:9789 ￿0:3039 0:8330 0:7743 0:0035
dummy-AFRi ￿0:2648 0:6601 ￿0:5079 0:6290 ￿0:0239 0:8837
dummy-EAPi 0:3947 0:5806 0:7235 0:5543 0:0336 0:8885
dummy-ECAi 1:2259 0:0704 2:0451 0:0965 0:2284 0:1330
dummy-MNAi 0:4327 0:5740 0:7880 0:5771 0:1288 0:5920
McFaddens R-squared 0:4039 ￿ 0:3973 ￿ 0:3583 ￿
No. of Countries 81 ￿ 81 ￿ 81 ￿
Dependent Variable = 1 57 Dependent Variable = 0 24




Explanatory Variable Coe¢ cient p-value Coe¢ cient p-value
GDPpci 1:4E-5 0:6618 ￿0:0001 0:0228
Indebti ￿0:0010 0:8748 0:0132 0:1462
Growthi 0:1566 0:3299 ￿0:5149 0:0107
stdev (Growth)i ￿0:1402 0:1568 0:4840 0:0140
stdev (inf)i 0:0014 0:0165 ￿2:7E-5 0:9627
stdev (ER)i 1:9E-6 0:0435 ￿0:0015 0:0032
stdev (tot)i ￿0:1339 0:0060 ￿0:2324 0:0047
stdev (CA/GDP)i 0:1525 0:2200 ￿0:0789 0:6736
coefvar(O¢ cTrans)i na na ￿0:7288 0:0015
constant 0:4155 0:6421 2:6197 0:0471
dummy-AFRi 1:3422 0:1840 ￿0:7743 0:4391
dummy-EAPi 0:7398 0:3510 1:6985 0:1584
dummy-ECAi 1:5153 0:0228 ￿0:7142 0:4200
dummy-MNAi 0:4929 0:4975 ￿4:3164 0:0024
McFaddens R-squared 0:2055 ￿ 0:4679 ￿
No. of Countries 60 ￿ 58 ￿
Dependent Variable = 1 42 ￿ 28 ￿
Dependent Variable = 0 18 ￿ 30 ￿
32Table 3: A list of countries included in regression analysis
ALBANIA CANADA FINLAND JORDAN NORWAY SWAZILAND
ALGERIA CHILE FRANCE KAZAKHSTAN PANAMA SWEDEN
ARGENTINA CHINA GABON KOREA PARAGUAY SYRIAN ARAB REP.
AUSTRALIA COLOMBIA GERMANY LATVIA PERU THAILAND
AUSTRIA COSTA RICA GREECE LEBANON PHILIPPINES TRINID. & TOBAGO
AZERBAIJAN CROATIA GUATEMALA LITHUANIA POLAND TUNISIA
BELARUS CZECH REP. HUNGARY LUXEMBOURG PORTUGAL TURKEY
BELGIUM DENMARK ICELAND MACEDONIA ROMANIA UKRAINE
BELIZE DOMINICAN REP. INDONESIA MALAYSIA SEYCHELLES UNITED KINGDOM
BOLIVIA ECUADOR IRELAND MAURITIUS SLOVAK REP. UNITED STATES
BOSNIA & HERZ. EGYPT ISRAEL MEXICO SLOVENIA VENEZUELA
BOTSWANA EL SALVADOR ITALY MOROCCO SOUTH AFRICA
BRAZIL EQUAT. GUINEA JAMAICA NETHERLANDS SPAIN
BULGARIA ESTONIA JAPAN NEW ZEALAND ST. VIN. & GREN.
Figure 1: Distribution of the Percentage of Countries with Strategies, and the Per-
centage of Public Strategies and Strategic Benchmarks out of Strategies Across In-
come Groups
33Figure 2: Distribution of the Percentage of Countries with Strategies, and the Per-
centage of Public Strategies and Strategic Benchmarks out of Strategies Across Re-
gions
34Figure 3: Distribution of the Percentage of Countries with Strategies, and the Per-
centage of Public Strategies and Strategic Benchmarks out of Strategies Across Levels
of Indebtedness
35Figure 4: Distributions of the Basic Types of Risk Addressed in Benchmarks Across
Income Groups, Regions and Levels of Indebtedness
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